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BANKRUPTCY AND THE AUTOMOBILE
DEALER
CHARLES E. MELVIN, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The competitiveness and growth, which have come to be character-
istic of the automotive industry today, give rise to a possibility that may
be encountered with more frequency in the future-the automobile
dealer in bankruptcy. With this possibility in mind, the purpose of this
paper is to discuss the problems that might be encountered by the trustee
in bankruptcy upon such a dealer being adjudicated a bankrupt.
The majority of automobile dealers find it either impractical or im-
possible to finance their purchases of new cars. To do so would re-
quire extremely large capital resources and necessitate tying up those
resources for long periods of time. Therefore, in most cases, new cars
found in the automobile dealer's showroom and on his lots will be
financed by means of some form of "floor plan" agreement with a com-
mercial financing institution.' On the other hand, used cars are usually
not financed, partly because they are frequently acquired as "trade ins"
in connection with the sale of new cars, and partly because of the
reluctance of financing institutions to finance used cars. However, in
some instances used cars are financed. 2
The actual operation of a "floor plan" agreement, in its basic prin-
ciple, is fairly uniform throughout the trade. The basis for a floor plan
will be an agreement between the financing institution, or lender, and
the dealer, whereby the lender agrees to finance the dealer's purchases
of new cars from the manufacturer for stipulated charges and under
prescribed conditions. When cars are purchased under this agreement,
the manufacturer,3 upon shipment of the cars, makes out a bill of sale,
draws a draft on the lender for the price of the cars, and forwards these'
with a bill of lading through banking channels to the lender. The
* Member, Student Board of Editors, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW.The majority of new car purchases, or wholesale financing, is done by com-
mercial financing companies, with a small percentage being financed by banks.
Three nation wide finance companies that emphasize this form of financing are
General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Universal CIT and Commercial Credit
Co. Regional companies are numerous.
2 In many instances the dealer may desire to finance only a part of his used
car inventory, and he is quite likely to utilize local banks, finance companies, or any
financial institution that is willing to undertake such a transaction.
'The normal situation will find the manufacturer demanding immediate pay-
ment for cars shipped. But see, Universal Credit Co. v. Botetourt Motors, 180 Va.
159, 21 S. E. 2d 800 (1942).
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lender pays the draft and receives the bill of sale and the bill of lading.
Upon obtaining from the dealer promissory notes for the amount of the
purchases and finance charges, along with trust receipts or other security
instruments, the lender turns over to the dealer the bill of lading,
thereby enabling him to get possession of the cars.4
Thus, this general background data in regard to the acquisition of
the dealer's inventory illustrates that in the majority of cases the trustee
in bankruptcy of an automobile dealer can expect that creditors of the
bankrupt will claim liens on many, if not all, of the cars in the dealer's
possession. In determining the validity of these liens, the general
nature of the various credit instruments used in connection with these
floor plan agreements and other financing done by automobile dealers,
and state law relating thereto, become important in the application of
the bankruptcy law. Therefore, it would be advantageous to consider
these factors briefly before examining the sections of the Bankruptcy
Act.
TRuSTs RECEIPTS
The trust receipt is the most widely employed security device used
by the larger finance companies in the floor plan type of financing trans-
action.5 Normally, the trust receipt contemplates a tripartite agreement,
as illustrated in the case of the lender financing cars purchased from a
manufacturer by a dealer. In such a situation, title passes to the lender
from the manufacturer, and the lender retains title and entrusts only
possession to the dealer, or trustee, to be held by him subject to the
terms of the trust receipt.6 Some courts have held, considering the
theory of the transactions-that title never passes to the dealer, or
buyer-that the transaction is valid against sfibsequent lien creditors
without recordation of the trust receipt.7  However, other jurisdictions
have held trust receipts to be chattel mortgages, conditional sales,8 etc.,
which must be recorded in accordance with statutory provisions relating
to those instruments.
'This of course is only a skeletel outline. The details and particulars are sus-
ceptible to variation between different finance companies. For an interesting dis-
cussion of a typical agreement between a finance company and a dealer see, Houck
'v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 44 F. 2d 410 (W. D. Pa. 1930).
'But see Universal Credit Co. v. Botetourt Motors, 180 Va. 159, 21 S. E. 2d
-800 (1942).
' For an interesting discussion of trust receipts see In re James Inc., 30 F. 2d
555 (2d Cir. 1929) ; Bacon, A Trust Receipt Transaction, 5 FORDHAm L. REV. 17
(1936).
'See In re Bell Motor Co., 45 F. 2d 19 (8th Cir. 1938), where the court
-recognizes the validity as against creditors of an unrecorded trust receipt.
' In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E.
767 (1928), the North Carolina Supreme Court held a trust receipt transaction is
-a conditional sale, and consequently must meet the recordation requirements for
a conditional sale.
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In addition to its use in the normal tripartite situation, is also in
bipartite transactions. In this situation, the dealer has already gained
title and possession of the chattels and thereafter, in consideration for
a loan, he executes to the lender a bill of sale for the chattels plus trust
receipts and retains only possession of the chattels. This form of trust
receipt financing, in absence of express statutory provision, has almost
always been held to require recordation in order to be valid against sub-
sequent lien, or other classes of creditors. 9
In a majority of the states today, the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
has been adopted. 10  This Act recognizes both tripartite and bipartite
transactions and specifically requires recording. However, the recorda-
tion required is not of the individual trust receipts but a filing of a
statement of the transaction of the trust receipt financing with a desig-
nated state official within a period of thirty days after delivery of the
goods to the trustee, or borrower."
CONDITIONAL SALES
Though the conditional sale might conceivably be used in the floor
plan type of financing, it is mainly used in the automotive field to secure
sales by the dealer to an ultimate purchaser. 12 Thus, the conditional
sale probably will not concern the trustee of a bankrupt automobile
dealer as frequently as will chattel mortgages or trust receipts. How-
ever, in some jurisdictions trust receipts are held to be conditional sales 3
and since the possibility exists of their use in other types of financing
of the automobile dealer, the general law concerning them will be re-
viewed.
The conditional sale is more closely related to the trust receipt than
to the chattel mortgage in that the seller seeks to reserve title to the
goods while transferring possession and use to the buyer. In view of
the fact that the seller conveys only a beneficial interest to the buyer
while retaining complete legal title, some states have held that the
conditional vendor will prevail over a subsequent lien creditor even
without recordation of the conditional sale.14 Other jurisdictions require
See In re James, Inc., 30 F. 2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929).
10 As of 1954, the 32 following states and territories had adopted the Uniform
Trust Receipt Act: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
1 Uniform Trust Receipts Act §§ 8, 13.
" But see Universal Credit Co. v. Botetourt Motors, 180 Va. 159, 21 S. E. 2d
800 (1942).
1 See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E.
767 (1928).
1" The majority view is, that unless recording of conditional sales is specifically
required, the conditional vendor will prevail over subsequent lien creditors. I
WILu IsTo, SALES §§ 324, 325 (2d ed. 1924).
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recordation in order that the conditional vendor prevail over a subsequent
lien or other classes of creditors.15
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
In financing new cars purchased from other dealers rather than
the manufacturer, a chattel mortgage will usually be used to secure that
transaction. The chattel mortgage will also be used, generally, where
the dealer finances the used cars which are in his possession.
The chattel mortgage, in contrast to the conditional sale, con-
templates that the complete title to the chattel is in the debtor, who
transfer a security interest to the lender. As title is originally in the
debtor and he retains possession after the chattel mortgage is executed,
almost all states require some form of recordation for the chattel mort-
gage to prevail over certain classes of subsequent creditors. 16 Again,
the states take various views as to the effect of lack of recordation; how-
ever, probably a majority hold that the unrecorded chattel mortgage
will prevail over some classes of creditors but will not prevail as to sub-
sequent lien creditors. 17
From the above it can be seen that two important questions must
be determined in relation to credit transactions before the applicable
bankruptcy sections can be considered. These are: (1) What will the
court label the particular transaction? (2) What are the requirements of
the particular jurisdiction as to recordation, and what effect does the
instrument have if unrecorded? The above discussion also shows that
no generalities can be drawn as to what the result will be; but because
of the great differences in the statutes and decisions of the various states,
the particular law for each jurisdiction must be examined.
THE TRUSTEE'S RIGHTS UNDER SEcTIo 60
The trustee has available three sections of the Bankruptcy Act which
afford him with affirmative means of attacking the transfers and obliga-
tions of the bankrupt. These are sections 60, 67, and 70. Section 60
of the Act makes preferental transfers made or suffered by the bank-
rupt voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy.
Section 60 a (1) of the Act defines the transfers which will be con-
sidered preferential under the Act.'8 Basically, the elements of a
20 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20 (1953) provides that conditional sales shall be
valid to pass any property as against lien creditors from the vendee but from the
time of registration thereof. See Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 6-9, for re-
quirements of those states having adopted the Act. See also Hetherington and
Sons v. Rudisill, 28 F. 2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1928).
14 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 70.81 (14th ed. 1942).
" 3 COLLUR, BANKRUPTCY 1 60.42 (14th ed. 1950).
" For the purposes of this article, sections cited shall refer to sections of the
Bankruptcy Act, unless otherwise indicated.
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preferential transfer are: (1) the debtor making or suffering a transfer
of his property, (2) to or for the benefit of a creditor, (3) for or on
account of an antecedent debt, (4) while insolvent, (5) within four
months of bankruptcy and (6) the effect of which will be to enable
the creditor to obtain a greater portion of his debt than some other
creditor of the same class.19 If all the above elements are present in a
transfer and the creditor receiving the preference had reasonable cause
to believe, at the time of the transfer, that the debtor was insolvent, then,
under Section 60 b,20 the transfer is voidable by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy.21
The trustee, in considering whether the transactions under which
creditors claim liens are voidable as preferential transfers, must analyze
them to determine if they contain all the above elements. These various
elements will now be considered in some detail.
Under the Bankruptcy Act, transfer is defined as including:
"The sale and every other and different mode, direct and indi-
rect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an interest
therein or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon
property or upon an interest therein, absolutely or conditionally,
voluntarily, by other without judicial proceedings, as a convey-
ance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, encum-
brance, gift, security or otherwise; the retention of a security
title to property delivered to a debtor shall be deemed a transfer
suffered by the debtor. ' '22
It is readily apparent that the above language is inclusive enough
to cover the three types of credit transactions which the trustee is likely
to encounter most frequently as a result of the dealer's having financed
the automobiles in his possession.
The next element of a preferential transfer is that it must be to or for
the benefit of a creditor. This is fairly self-explanatory. It simply takes
out of the purview of the section any transfer made to one who is not
a creditor of the bankrupt.23
The transfer must be for or on account of an antecedent debt.24 This
19§ 60 a (1).20 § 60 b.
1 It is apparent that the invoking of § 60 by the trustee involves the necessity of
proof of several elements, this will probably make it the least preferable means
of attacking a transaction, if there is any other section of the Act by which the
trustee can avoid the transfer.
22§ 1 (30).
2 See Bank of Anchorage v. Conroy, 284 Fed. 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1922).
2" From this wording has arisen the implication that the result of the transfer
must be to diminish the bankrupt's estate. Bachner v. Robinson, 107 F. 2d 513 (2d
Cir. 1939).
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element is subject to some difficulty in determination and requires a more
detailed consideration. By the wording of the section, a transfer which
is made in consideration of a debt which arose at a date prior to the
transfer is a transfer for or on account of an antecedent debt. To state
it otherwise, it is a transfer not made for a contemporaneous considera-
tion.2 5
In order to determine if the debt was prior in time to the transfer, it
becomes necessary to determine the date or time of the transfer. Section
60 a (2) provides that a transfer of property, other than real property,
shall be deemed to have been made or suffered at the time it becomes so
far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property oblainable by
legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior
to the rights of the transferee.2 6 The determination of when a transfer
becomes so perfected is almost completely dependent upon the law of
the state in which the transfer took place.27
Therefore, the trustee must ascertain the law in his jurisdiction in
regards to the requirements for perfecting of credit instruments so that
they will be superior to liens obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings.
The requirements of the various jurisdictions for such a degree of per-
fection differ greatly both as to the various credit instruments within
the same jurisdiction and as to the same credit instrument in different
jurisdictions. Generally speaking, it may be said that if some act, such
as recordation is required before the transaction will be deemed superior
to subsequent liens then under Section 60 a (2), the time of the transfer
will be, not as of the date of the original transaction, but as of the date'
of recordation or whatever other act that is necessary to perfect the
instrument against subsequent lien holders. However, this general rule
is subject to the very important exception provided by Section 60 a (7).
This section provides that if the applicable state law requires a trans-
fer of personal property for a new and contemporaneous consideration
to be perfected by recordation in order to prevent other liens from be-
coming superior to the rights of the transferee therein, the time of transfer
shall be determined by the following rules: (a) where the applicable
state law specifies a stated period of time of not more than twenty-one
days after the transfer within which recordation, or some other act is
required, and compliance is had therewith within such stated period of
time; or (b) the applicable law specifies no such stated period of time
or where such stated period of time is more than twenty-one days and
"Dinkelspiel v. Garrett, 96 F. Supp. 800 (W. D. Ark. 1951).
2O§ 60 a (2).
The doctrine Erie P. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), dispelled any
question about the applicability of state law in this situation. And see Corn Ex-
change Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 438 (1943).
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compliance therewith is had within twenty-one days after the transfer
(original transaction), the transfer shall be deemed to be made or
suffered at the time of the transfer (original transaction) .2s However,
if compliance is not had within the specified time, the transfer will be
deemed to have been made or suffered at the time of compliance. 2
"Relation back" is provided for in most jurisdictions. The normal
provision is that if the instrument is recorded within a specified number
of days or a "reasonable time," such recordation will "relate back"
to the date of the original transaction, and thus no liens can attach dur-
ing the interim between the giving of the instrument and the time of its
recordation. However, some states have no such provision for "relation
back."130 For the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, Section 60 a (7) pro-
vides that if in any sitaution the instrument is recorded within twenty-
one days, or within a lesser period if the state statute so provides, the
transfer will be deemed made or suffered at the date of the original trans-
action.31
Therefore, if the instrument comes within the purview of Section
60 a (7) the transfer will be deemed made at the time of the giving of
the instrument and as the debt for which the instrument is given arose
at the same date there will be no transfer for or on account of an ante-
cedent debt, and consequently no preference. But if the provisions of
Section 60 a (7) are not complied with, the transfer will not be deemed
made until recordation of the instrument and therefore at a time sub-
sequent to the creation of the debt.
The next element of a preferential transfer is that the transfer must
take place within four months of bankruptcy. This time interval, gen-
erally speaking, is computed by counting back four months from the date
of the filing of the petition initiating the proceeding under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.8 2  The conception of what constitutes a transfer and the
time at which it will be deemed to have been made in relation to security
devices was discussed above and should be referred to.33
Section 60 a (1) also stipulates that the transfer must occur while
the debtor is insolvent. The Act provides that a person is insolvent
whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which
he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, etc., shall not at a fair
2'8§ 60 a (7).
29§ 60 a (7).
"
0 It should be noted that North Carolina is such a state. N. C. Gm¢. STAT.
§ 47-20 (1953) provides that the chattel mortgage or conditional sale will be valid
against lien creditors from the time of recordation.
1 § 60 a (7).
32 Computation of the four month period is made according to the calendar
month and not by counting days. Bell v. West, 44 F. 2d 161 (4th Cir. 1930).
"Intentional delay on part of the debtor in filing a voluntary petition until
the expiration of four months after the transfer of securities does not affect the
character of the transaction. Bank of Sturgeon v. Stewart, 13 F. 2d 138 (D. Neb.
1926).
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valuation be sufficient to pay his debts.3 4 The language of Section 60 a
(1) clearly indicates that the debtor must have been insolvent at the
time the transfer was made. Thus, again, the determination of the
time of the transfer is of vital importance.
The last element required by Section 60 a (1) is that the result of
the transfer must be to enable the creditor to obtain a greater percentage
of his debt than some other creditor of the same class. This language
has been the subject of criticism and is not altogether clear at first
glance.3 5 However, without a detailed discussion of this provision it can
be said, generally speaking, that "class" means those creditors who are
entitled to receive the same percentage upon their claims out of the
estate of the bankrupt.36 The time for determining whether or not a
creditor has received a greater percentage is of the date of bankruptcy.8 7
In considering the avoidability of a transfer by virtue of Section
60, the trustee must find present in the transaction all of the above
elements. Then, if at the time the transfer was made, the creditor re-
ceiving the transfer had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was
insolvent, the trustee can avoid the transfer, as provided in Section
60 b.38
As illustrated in the discussion of the bankruptcy provisions the time
at which a transfer by security instrument will be deemed to have been
made is determined by local credit transaction law.39 Further, it must
be kept in mind that the determination of the time of transfer is an es-
sential part of all the elements of a preferential transfer except the
determination of whether the creditor has received a greater portion
of his debt than other creditors of the same class. This being true, an
effort will now be made to tie the general rules relating to credit instru-
ments discussed at the outset in with the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act discussed above. In doing so, the three credit instruments pre-
dominately in use by automobile dealers will be discussed separately.
THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE AS A PREFERENCE
As pointed out earlier, the majority of states require some form
of recordation of chattel mortgages in order for them to be superior to
the claims of certain classes of subsequent creditors of the mortgagor.
Thus, at the time the mortgagee receives the chattel mortgage instru-
ment from the mortgagor he, according to the majority view, still does
,§ 1 (19).
3 CoLLER, BANKRUPTCY ff 60.34 (14th ed. 1950). And see In re Silver, 109
F. Supp. 200 (E. D. Ill. 1952).
80 Swarts v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 117 Fed. 1 (8th Cir. 1902).
'T Palmer Clay Products v. Brown, 297 U. S. 227 (1936).
.8 § 60 b.
" See note 27, supra.
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not have a lien on the mortgaged property superior to liens of subse-
quent creditors until he complies with the particular jurisdiction's
recordation requirements; and therefore, by virtue of Section 60 a (2)
there has been no transfer. Only when the chattel mortgagee performs
the act, which by state law will make the chattel mortgage superior to
the claims of subsequent lien creditors, will there be a transfer under
the provision of Section 60 a (2). This is, of course, subject to the ex-
ception of 60 a (7), under which a subsequent recordation will relate
back to the original transaction in certain cases.40 After the time of
transfer has been determined by application of the state law as pre-
scribed by Section 60, the determination of whether the transfer has
been within four months of bankruptcy and whether it was for or on
account of an antecedent debt is a relatively simple matter. Some
hypothetical fact situations will serve to illustrate these problems.
A, an automobile dealer, has on his lot a new car that he has pur-
chased from another dealer. In consideration for the value of the car, A
gives to X, finance company, a chattel mortgage on the car. The state's
statutes provide that an unrecorded chattel mortgage is void against
subsequent lien creditors, and further provide that a chattel mortgage, if
recorded within fifteen days will be deemed made as of the date the
chattel mortgagee received the instrument. If X waits for two months
before he records the chattel mortgage, then clearly, under the provisions
of Section 60 a (2), the date of tle transfer will be the date of recorda-
tion. Section 60 a (7) does not alter this. since the recordation took
place more than fifteen days 4' after the execution of the chattel mort-
gage. Therefore, if the recordation took place within four months of
A's bankruptcy, there would be both a transfer within four months of
bankruptcy and a transfer for or on account of an antecedent debt, since
the transfer took place two months subsequent to the creation of the
debt for which it was consideration. And, assuming the other elements
of a preference persent, the chattel mortgage would be void as to the
trustee.
However, assuming the same fact situation, suppose that ten days
after the chattel mortgage was executed, X duly recorded it. Further
assume that two months after the execution of the chattel mortgage A
is adjudicated a bankrupt. Is there a preferential transfer? The answer
is no. Here, Section 60 a (7) has been complied with and therefore the
transfer is deemed made as of the time of the original transaction.
There is then, a transfer within four months of A's bankruptcy, but
it is not for an antecedent debt, since the debt arose on the same date
o See the discussion on the application of Section 60 a (7), supra.
"1 If the state's specified period for recordation is less than 21 days, then the
shorter period must be complied with. § 60 a (7).
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that the transfer is deemed to have been made.42 Although this dis-
cussion has not scratched the surface of the innumerable problems that
might arise in regards to determining whether chattel mortgages are
preferences, it is hoped that it does illustrate the main area in which
they might be declared voidable preferences.
THE TRUST RECEIPT AS A PREFERENCE
In the discussion of trust receipts earlier, it was pointed out that
some states may hold them to be valid against subsequent lien creditors
without recordation; in others, recordation of each instrument is re-
quired as in the case of chattel mortgages ;3 and in those states, having
adopted the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, there must be a filing of a
statement of the trust receipt transaction between the lender and bor-
rower with a designated state official.44 Also, some states hold a trust
receipt to be a conditional sale, a sale with a mortgage back, or one of
various other forms of credit instruments. In such states, the law
applicable to the particular instrument which the trust receipt is held
to be will be applicable.
In case the jurisdiction is one of the minority which hold the trust
receipt valid against subsequent lien creditors without recordation 45 the
time of the transfer will be the time of the original transaction. In such
a situation there will be no possibility of a preferential transfer, provided
the trust receipts are given by the debtor at the same time his debt is in-
curred, since there is no possibility of the transfer being deemed to have
been made at a later date by virtue of later recordation. Consequently
there is no transfer for or on account of an antecedent debt.
If the state law requires some form of recordation, then the same
problems, as have been discussed in regard to the chattel mortgage, arise
in determining the time when the transfer will be deemed to have been
made, and in determining whether there has been a transfer for or on ac-
count of an antecedent debt. That is, the transfer will be deemed to have
been made upon the date of recordation, unless the provisions of Section
60 a (7) are met, and if after determining the date of transfer, it is
found to be subsequent to the date on which the debt arose, the transfer
will be for an antecedent debt.
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, as noted above, specifically re-
quires filing of a statement of the agreement to finance in order that
42 See Dienkelspiel v. Garrett, 96 F. Supp. 800 (W. D. Ark. 1951).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. 47-20 (1953) requires recordation of conditional sales
contracts and chattel mortgages in order for them to prevail over subsequent
creditors. This requirement extends to trust receipts inasmuch as they are treated
as conditional sales contracts by the North Carolina Supreme Court. General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767 (1928).
"Uniform Trust Receipts Act §§ 8, 13.See note 8, supra.
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the trust receipt will prevail over subsequent lien creditors. However,
the Uniform Act provides thirty days in which this may be done and the
transfer still be deemed made at the date of the original transaction. The
determination of the time of transfer and whether the transfer is for
an antecedent debt will still be controlled by the twenty-one day maxi-
mum period allowed by Section 60 a (7).
To illustrate, if A, an automobile dealer, executes trust receipts to
X, a finance company, for cars financed by X, and X waits twenty-nine
days to file the statement of the transaction with the designated state
official, even though the Uniform Act provides a thirty day filing period,
the transfer would be deemed, for the purposes of Section 60, made as
of the date of filing and if this date were within four months of bank-
ruptcy would constitute that element of a preferential transfer. Also,
since the date of the transfer would be twenty-nine days subsequent to
the arising of the debt, there would be a transfer for an antecedent
debt.46
THE CONDITIONAL SALE AS A PREFERENCE
The determination of whether a conditional sale constitutes a prefer-
ential transfer will, to a large extent, turn upon the same factors dis-
cussed in connection with the chattel mortgage and trust receipt. Again,
the state law governing conditional sales must be ascertained, and the
time of the transfer determined thereunder. Also, the determination of
whether the transfer was for an antecedent debt will be made in the
same manner.
It should be remembered that some jurisdictions consider the condi-
tional sale as being valid against subsequent lien creditors without re-
cordation. In such jurisdictions, as long as the conditional sale is given
at the same time the obligation for which it is consideration is incurred,
there is no possibility of a preferential transfer, since the transfer will
not be for an antecedent debt.
RESERVE AcCOUNTS
In the recent case of Carusoe v. Associates Discount Corp.,47 under
a typical trust receipt "floor plan" agreement between the finance com-
pany and the automobile dealer, the finance company required the dealer
to maintain with it a reserve account for the protection of the finance
company in the event of any losses on any of its financial transactions
"' See Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnel, 192 F. 2d 773 (4th Cir.
1951). Here, the court holds a trust receipt, properly filed under the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act not a preference within § 60. The court gives an enlightening
discussion of the history of judicial attitude toward trust receipts under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
'* 129 F. Supp. 598 (N. D. Fla. 1955).
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with the dealer. 48 The finance company by means of threats and in-
timidation had required the dealer to execute an instrument within four
months of bankruptcy assigning the reserve account to the finance com-
pany. The court held, in a memorandum decision, without citing any
authority either under the Bankruptcy Act or judicial decisions, that
the instrument assigning the reserve was void as to unsecured creditors
and the amounts assigned were improperly retained by the finance com-
pany.
As this point is of vital interest to the trustee in bankruptcy of an
automobile dealer, it is unfortunate that the court did not set forth its
basis for holding the assignment void as to the trustee. Although it is
not clear from the facts given whether all the elements of a voidable
preference were present, it seems fairly inferable that that assignment
was voidable by the trustee as a preferential transfer. There was cer-
tainly a transfer by the debtor to the creditor for an antecedent debt.
It appears probable that at the time of the transfer the debtor was in-
solvent, and that it enabled the finance company to obtain a greater
portion of his debt than other creditors of the same class. Also, it is
reasonable to assume that the creditor knew of the dealer's financial
condition.49
There has been no discussion of assignments of accounts receivable
in relation to Section 60, as, normally this means of financing will be sel-
dom used in financing the purchase of automobiles. Generally speaking,
in case of such assignments, some type of notice to third persons is
required, and similar considerations to those discussed in regards to the
credit transactions taken up will determine. if assignments of accounts
receivable are voidable preferences.
In conclusion, the predominate way in which Section 60 can be uti-
lized by the trustee in bankruptcy of an automobile dealer is where the
law in the jurisdiction in which the transaction took place requires some
form of recordation or perfection in order that the credit transaction be
valid against certain classes of subsequent creditors, and that recordation
or perfection is delayed so as to fall within four months of the initia-
tion of proceedings in bankruptcy against or by the dealer.
THE TRUSTEE'S RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 70
Another means available to the trustee to attack the validity of obliga-
tions and transfers of the bankrupt is furnished by Section 70 of the
" It appears to be a common practice of finance companies to require reserves
of this nature.
,' Although it seems likely that the assignment was void as a preferential
transfer under § 60, as discussed, since the court speaks of the assignment being
void as to unsecured creditors, it is possible that the court considered the assign-
ment voidable under § 70 c.
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Bankruptcy Act, subsections (c) and (e). Since the purposes and in-
tended effect of the two provisions are different, they will be considered
separately.
Section 70 c provides that the trustee may have the benefit of all
defenses available to the bankrupt as against third persons, including
statutes of limitation, statutes of fraud, usury, and other personal de-
fenses; a waiver of any such defense by the bankrupt shall not bind
the trustee. Further, and of most importance to the trustee of a bank-
rupt automobile dealer, this section provides that the trustee, as to
all property, whether or not coming into possession or control of the
court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a
lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall
be deemed vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and
powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings,
whether or not such a, creditor actually exists.50
Under the wording of the section, the trustee is vested, as of the
date of the filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Act, with a lien
obtainable by legal or equitalle proceedings.' 1 The date upon which the
trustee's lien is deemed to vest is of great importance in determining its
priority over other liens. Thus, as the trustee has a vested lien as of
the date of the filing of a petition under the Act, the next question is
over what liens claimed by the bankrupt's creditors will the trustee pre-
vail? In considering this question, it may again be desirable to con-
sider separately the three predominate credit instruments which an
automobile dealer might use.
Again, it should be emphasized that in considering a particular
transaction it is of importance to determine first exactly what label the
state court will put on the transaction. Having determined this, then
the law of the particular jurisdiction as to that form of credit trans-
action can be ascertained.
THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE UNDER SECTION 70 c
If the instrument in question is a chattel mortgage, then, under Sec-
tion 70 c the trustee, by virtue of his position as a lien creditor, will
have a superior claim to the chattel encumbered by the chattel mortgage,
whenever under the law of the State in which the mortgage was exe-
cuted, a creditor who without notice had successfully levied on the
property at the date of bankruptcy would have had such a claim.52
To illustrate, if the chattel mortgage in question is unrecorded, and
"' It is not necessary under § 70 c that an actual creditor fasten a lien on the
property in issue by legal or equitable process. Robbins v. Bostonian, 135 F. 2d
298 (8th Cir. 1943).51§ 70 c.
"
2 In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F. 2d 668 (S. D. Miss. 1932).
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the law of the state provides that an unrecorded chattel mortgage
is void against creditors of the mortgagor, then certainly, a creditor
of the mortgagor could obtain a lien by legal or equitable proceedings
which would be superior to the chattel mortgage, and thus, the trus-
tee, given such a lien by Section 70 c, will prevail over the unrecorded
mortgage. If, as is the case in many states, the statute provides that
an unrecorded chattel mortgage will prevail over all creditors except
those who levy before recordation,5 3 the trustee will again prevail
since 70 c provides him with a lien at the date of bankruptcy when
the chattel mortgage is still unrecorded.
Improper or ineffective recordation is, of course, of no greater effect
than lack of recordation and will constitute grounds for attack by the
trustee under the provisions of Section 70 c. Some examples of re-
quirements of recordation statutes, failure of compliance with which
renders the recordation ineffective, are: (1) certain affidavits must
accompany the recorded instrument 4 (2) chattel mortgages must be ac-
knowledged to give effective notice to third parties55 and (3) recordation
must be made in specific counties, townships, etc.56 Another problem
affecting the validity of the recordation may arise when the encumbered
chattel is removed from the county in which the mortgage is recorded.57
If moved to another part of the same state, many states require a re-
filing within a specified number of days in the new county to which the
chattel is moved.58 Generally speaking, if the chattel is moved from the
state in which the chattel mortgage is recorded, the law of the state in
which the chattel mortgage is executed will govern as to recordation re-
quirements.5 9
If there has been effective recordation of any sort, such recordation
if had prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, will make the
chattel mortgage unsusceptible to attack by Section 70 c, since the lien
obtained by the recordation will be prior to that obtained by the trustee.
THE CONDITIONAL SALE UNDER SECTION 70 c
If the transaction involved is a conditional sale, against which the
trustee in bankruptcy seeks to assert his lien under Section 70 c, similar
" Such is the provision of N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20 (1953).
" O'dea v. Universal Credit Co., 21 N. J. Misc. 93, 31 A. 2d 342 (1943).
r Albert Pick & Co. v. Wilson, 19 F. 2d 18 (8th Cir. 1927).
" See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20.2 (1953) for requirements as to place in which
credit instruments must be recorded.
" In North Carolina where a chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract
is registered in the proper county, subsequent change of residence of the mortgagor
or vendee, or subsequent removal of the property to another county of the state,
does not affect the lien, there being no requirement of a second registration in this
state in either of these events. Montague Bros. v. Shepherd Co., 236 N. C. 551,
58 S. E. 2d 118 (1950).
8 In re Neil, 44 F. 2d 666 (W. D. Wash. 1930).
" See R. F. C. v. Weiner, 192 F. 2d 760 (2d Cir. 1952).
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considerations as those discussed in relation to chattel mortgages will
be present. It must be determined what type of transaction will be
considered a conditional sale and what the law of that state is as to per-
fecting the conditional sale against subsequent creditors. As has been
previously pointed out, some states recognize the validity of a conditional
sale against all classes of creditors without recordation, but the majority
require recordation or perfection of some sort. Therefore, if the juris-
diction requires some form of perfection or recordation before the trans-
action will prevail over a subsequent lien creditor, and that recordation
has not been had, or is defective for some reason, the trustee may assert
the lien provided by Section 70 c against the unrecorded conditional
sale and prevail over it.6O
If the applicable state law provides that the conditional sale, un-
recorded, will prevail ovef all but subsequent bona fide purchasers and
encumbrancers for value, the trustee under Section 70 c will probably
not prevail, since he is only in the position of a judgment creditor with
a lien and not an encumbrancer for value.0 1
If under the terms of the conditional sale it is provided that upon
certain conditions the vendor may repossess the chattel, and if, in fact,
he does so reposses, some courts hold that such repossession is an effec-
tive substitute for recordation. Possession by the vendor is considered
effective notice to third persons of the encumbrance and therefore elim-
inates the necessity for recordation. Such repossession, as prior recorda-
tion, may therefore render ineffective the trustee's lien under Section
70 c.
THaE TRUST RECEIPT UNDER SEcTIoN 70 c
The diversity of legal effect given to trust receipts can be summed
up as follows: (1) the trust receipt is valid as to subsequent lien credi-
tors without recordation or perfection, (2) each individual trust receipt
must be recorded in a manner similar to the recordation required for
chattel mortgages and conditional sales, and (3) under the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, a filing of a statement of the transaction with some
designated state official is necessary for the trust receipt to prevail over
subsequent lien creditors.
In the first situation, it is apparent that normally the trustee's lien
will not prevail over the trust receipt, as the trust receipt is valid against
subsequent lien creditors from its inception without recordation. 2 How-
ever, in either of the last two, the trustee may prevail if there has
'0 McKay v. Trusco Finance Co., 198 F. 2d 431 (5th Cir. 1952).
61 Ibid.
"
2li re Bell Motor Co., 45 F. 2d 19 (8th Cir. 1930).
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been either lack of recordation, improper recordation, or some other fatal
defect in perfection of the trust receipt.63
It should be noted in regards to attacking all three types of credit
instruments by means of Section 70 c that in some states there are
"traders acts" or "sign statutes" which require specific notice or pub-
licity to be given where one trades or deals under his own name in goods
not actually his own. These may operate independently of recording
provisions and it is possible that some states will hold that failure to
comply with these provisions will make any one of the three credit
instruments invalid as to certain classes of creditors.6 4 It is possible
that the trustee by virtue of his lien as of the date of bankruptcy might
prevail over a particular credit transaction, where these statutes have not
been complied with.
TRUSTEES RIGHTS UNDER 70 e
Section 70 e of the Bankruptcy Act affords a second affirmative
means for the trustee to attack transfers and obligations of the bank-
rupt. Subsection (1) of this section provides that a transfer made or
suffered or an obligation incurred by a bankrupt debtor, which under
any federal or state law, is fraudulent as against, or voidable for any
other reason by any creditor of the debtor having a claim provable un-
der the Act, shall be null and void as against the trustee of such debtor.
Two provisions of the above subsection are important. First, the
section makes void as against the trustee any obligation or transfer
which is fraudulent, under federal or state law as to any creditor
of the debtor. This provision supplements Section 67,65 which defines
and enumerates obligations and transfer which will be deemed fraudulent
by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act. Whereas Section 67 sets out detailed
criteria for determining whether a transfer is fraudulent under that
Section, the determination of whether a transfer is fraudulent under
Section 70 e is based entirely upon state law, the Bankruptcy Act fur-
nishing no criteria. Further, under Section 70 e, in contrast to Section
67, there must be in actual existence at the time of bankruptcy a
creditor as to whom the particular transfer was fraudulent having a
claim provable under the Act.66 A few situations in which transactions
are generally held fraudulent under state lavw are illustrated below.
Generally, lack of recordation of credit instruments is not of itself
fraudulent. However, in many states the transaction will be considered
" In re McManus Motors, 27 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 1939). See also Crusoe
v. Associate Discount Corp., 129 F. Supp. 598 (N. D. Fla. 1955) where the court
held trust receipts not meeting requirements of the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act
void as to creditors and thus voidable by the trustee.
"See, Note, 26 VA. L. REv. 962 (1941).
To be discussed, infra.
"§ 70 e (1).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fraudulent if there is an agreement between the debtor and creditor.
that the creditor will not record the instrument.67 For example, where
a finance company agrees with an automobile dealer not to record trust
receipts given to it by the dealer to prevent public notice of financial
difficulty of the dealer, such an agreement might be held fraudulent and
therefore the trust receipts would be voidable by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy.
The majority of states hold that a transfer of security in which the
transferor reserves the right to dispose of the property and apply the
proceeds as he sees fit is fraudulent and void."" This rule is commonly
applied to pledges, assignments or mortgages of "stocks in trade or mer-
chandise." However, if the proceeds from the sale of the stock or mer-
chandise are to be turned over to the mortgagee and applied in payment
of the debt, the transaction will be sustained in the absence of other
fraudulent circumstances. 69
The above is in no way intended to be an exhaustive discussion of the
possible situations in which the trustee can invoke Section 70 e to have a
transaction declared fraudulent and thus void as to him. The situations
in which, by statute or court decision, a particular transaction or obliga-
tion entered into by the automobile dealer will be deemed fraudulent are
innumerable. Therefore, in order to utilize this section to its fullest ex-
tent the trustee must thoroughly familiarize himself with the law of
his state concerning fraudulent transactions.
In addition to the provision for attacking a transaction as being
fraudulent under federal or state law, Section 70 e provides that a trans-
fer or obligation which under state law is void as to creditors for any
other reason shall be void as to the trustee.
Section 70 contains no time limit or period of time within which
transfers or obligations affected are deemed voidable.70 Hence, it must
be determined under state law whether at the time of bankruptcy the
creditor, whose rights the trustee seeks to assert, could have avoided the
transfer.-' Also, as under other sections of the Act, the recordation
provisions of the various states play an important role in the application
of Section 70 e. Because of this, a brief restatement of some of the
factors set out earlier will be helpful.
Three situations exist as to when the recordation of credit instru-
ments made subsequent to the original transaction will be deemed to have
"It re Gill, 92 F. 2d 810 (5th Cir. 1937).
" See In re Freaman, 84 F. Supp. 193 (D. N. H. 1949). Benedict v. Ratner, 268
U. S 353. (1925).
60 Ibid.7 An action under § 70 e is not subject to the time limitations of §§ 60 and 67.
" Thus, where the creditor's remedy is barred by the running of the statute
of limitations prior to bankruptcy, the trustee is likewise barred. Heffron v.
Duggins, 115 F. 2d 519 (9th Cir. 19405.
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been made at the time of the original transaction. These are: (1) Within
a stipulated number of days. Here, if recordation is had within the
stipulated number of days, there will be no possibility of a subsequent
creditor securing a prior lien during the time between the original trans-
action and the recording thereof, since the recordation relates back to
the date of the original transaction when made within the stipulated
time. (2) Within a reasonable time.72 If recordation is had within a
reasonable time, there is, again, no chance for a creditor to secure a prior
lien during the interim between the transactions and the recordation
since the recordation will relate back to the date of the original trans-
action. (3) Where no time limit is set. Under this classification, as no
time limit is set there can be no relation back.73 Therefore, if any credi-
tor is successful in attaching a lien before the instrument is recorded,
and recordation is required against subsequent lien holders, his lien will
be prior in time to the one obtained by the later recordation.
In relation to the above, it should be noted that Section 60 a (7) pro-
viding for relation back when recordation is had within twenty-one days
of the original transaction, has no application in determining the rights
of the trustee under Section 70 e. That section is applicable only in
determining the date on which the transfer will be deemed to have been
made in so far as the Bankruptcy Act is concerned. Under Section 70 e
the trustee's rights are wholly governed by state law. Thus, if the state
law provides a period of any number of days in which an instrument may
be recorded and still relate back to the date of the original transaction,
that specified number of days will govern, and not the time limit im-
posed by Section 60 a (7). This may be of particular concern in those
states having adopted the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, since the time
limit imposed by that act is thirty days, or nine days in excess of the
maximum time limit allowed by Section 60 a (7).
As pointed out earlier, if there has been no recordation or an in-
effective recordation prior to bankruptcy, the trustee may utilize the
lien provided him by Section 70 c to attack the transaction. But if there
has been any form of effective recordation, Section 70 c will not be ap-
plicable. In numerous situations where recordation has taken the trans-
action out of the purview of Section 70 c and the elements necessary for
2The holdings of the state courts must be looked to in order to determine
what is deemed a reasonable time. See R. F. C. v. Weiner, 192 F. 2d 666 (2d
Cir. 1951), where the court holds, under New York lien law that filing within
seven days is reasonable, and General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Collier, 106
F. 2d 584 (6th Cir. 1939) in which the court holds a delay of six days in re-
cording a chattel mortgage unreasonable. In Zamore v. Golblatt, 194 F. 2d 933(2d Cir. 1952) the court holds a delay of twenty-nine days not reasonable under
New York lien law.
"' Such is the case in North Carolina where N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20 (1953)
provides that chattel mortgages or conditional sales will be valid against lien
creditors only from the time of the recording thereof.
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a voidable preference, under Section 60, are not present, the trustee will
be able to utilize effectively Section 70 e.
For instance, in the first two categories discussed above, if recordation
is not made until after the stipulated number of days, or until after a
"reasonable time" has elapsed, then, the transfer is not deemed made
until the date of recordation. And, if a creditor, under the law of the
state, was successful in obtaining a lien thereon prior to recordation, his
lien will be superior because of its priority in time. Thus, to that cred-
itor the transaction will be void, and the trustee under Section 70 e may
avoid the transaction as to himself by asserting the creditor's rights.
This illustrates how the trustee may utilize Section 70 e, and points
up the necessity that there be a creditor in existence at the time of bank-
ruptcy who has a claim provable under the Act, and as to whom the
transaction is voidable for some reason under state law.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE UNDER 70 e
In considering the means by which Section 70 e can be utilized in
attacking the validity of a chattel mortgage, the same general principles
of state law already discussed will be applicable. Since normally re-
cordation of some form is always required in order to perfect a chattel
mortgage against certain classes of creditors, one of the important
considerations, here, is what classes of creditors will prevail over an
unrecorded chattel mortgage. As previously stated, the law of different
states varies widely on this point. Some provide that only lien creditors
and bona fide purchasers can prevail over the unrecorded chattel mort-
gage ;74 others provide that general creditors may prevail over the un-
recorded chattel mortgage. These provisions are important, for where
general creditors are permitted to prevail over the unrecorded mortgage,
it is apparent that there is a much greater possibility of the existence of
a creditor having a claim provable under the Act against whom a par-
ticular chattel mortgage is void, and thus the trustee's chances of utilizing
Section 70 e are thereby increased. 75
Some states require the refiling of a chattel mortgage after a speci-
fied period of time has elapsed from the date of original recordation. If
"See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20 (1953).
" In North Carolina, as previously pointed out, a chattel mortgage or condi-
tional sale (or trust receipt by court decision) is void as to lien creditors until
recorded. If the holder of the security instument waits for a period of time
before recording, it is possible that a creditor might obtain a lien on the chattel
by levy under execution. However, before the trustee can attack the particular
transaction, there must be in existence, at the time of bankruptcy, a creditor who,
in fact, was successful in attaching a lien on the property. This is true, because
unless the creditor had obtained a lien prior to recordation by the holder of the
instrument, once the holder does record, the creditor is barred from thereafter ob-
taining a lien by levy under execution. This situation greatly decreases the chances
of having a particular credit instrument avoided by the trustee under § 70 e. Se6
& j Finance Co. v. Hodges, 230 N. C. 580, 55 S. E. 2d 201 (1949).
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the refiling is delinquent, there arises the possibility that during the in-
terim between the time when refiling was required and the time when
it was actually accomplished the chattel mortgage became void as to
some creditor 7 Any of these possibilities, if they actually occur as to
a creditor, can be taken advantage of by the trustee in bankruptcy. 77
To illustrate a situation in which the trustee could attack a chattel
mortgage by virtue of Section 70 e, assume that a debtor, in consideration
for a loan, gives the lendor a chattel mortgage to secure the obligation.
Further assume that in the particular jurisdiction a chattel mortgage
must be recorded in order to prevail over general creditors of the debtor,
and that a period of ten days is allowed in which the mortgage may be
recorded and relate back to the date of the giving of the instrument.
In this situation, suppose the creditor, or mortgagee, waits twenty days
before he records, and during this period a creditor, without notice of the
chattel mortgage, extends credit to the debtor. It would follow, from
the assumptions above, that as to this creditor the chattel mortgage,
even though now recorded, would be void. Therefore, the trustee could
assert this creditor's rights against the chattel mortgagee and have the
chattel mortgage declared void as to the trustee.
78
CONDITIONAL SALES AND TRUST RECEIPTS UNDER 70 e
Essentially the same general principles would be applicable to con-
ditional sales and trust receipts. If some form of recordation is re-
quired against certain classes of creditors and that recordation is not
had within the time specified, the transaction may be void as to some
creditor by virtue of the delinquent recordation, and therefore, will be
avoidable by the trustee. In prior discussion, it has been pointed out
that in the states having the Uniform Trust Receipts Act that recorda-
tion of the agreement between the parties is necessary in order for the
transaction to be valid against lien creditors, and a time limit of thirty
days is stipulated in which recordation will relate back to the time of the
original transaction. It is evident that in this situation, if the proper
recordation is not had until after-a period of thirty days, a creditor might
be successful in attaching a lien on the chattels held under the trust
" It re Robertson Co., 26 F. Supp. 870 (N. D. N. Y. 1938).
77 If the state provides that such transactions, unrecorded, are void only as to
bona fide purchasers for value, there is practically no chance of the trustee being
able to assert this provision of the Act in attacking the credit instrument, since
the trustee is not in the position of a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer for
value. See It re James, 30 F. 2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929).
"8 Here, in contrast to note 74, supra, in states providing that unrecorded credit
instruments are void as to general creditors, or creditors who extend credit during
the period of lack of recordation, the existence of such a creditor with a claim
provable as of the time of bankruptcy will enable the trustee to invoke that credi-
tor's rights and avoid the transaction. That is, in such state, all that is required
is that there be a creditor or an extension of credit and the unrecorded instrument
is void as to him, regardless of subsequent recordation.
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receipts, which would make the trust receipts void as to him, and conse-
quently to the trustee under the powers granted him by Section 70 e.
DOCTRINE OF MOORE V. BAY
It should be emphasized that if a transaction is fraudulent or void
as to one creditor, and the trustee can assert that creditors' rights and
have the transaction declared void as to the trustee under Section 70 e,
then the effect is that the transaction is void as to all the creditors. That
is, in asserting Section 70 e, the trustee is not protecting only the rights
of the creditor to whom the transaction is void, but is avoiding it as to
all the creditors of the bankrupt. This doctrine was firmly established
by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Moore v. Bay.79
Although subject to some criticism, the holding of that case has been
followed uniformly by the courts.8 0
To illustrate the import of this doctrine, perhaps a hypothetical fact
situation would be helpful. Suppose that in consideration of a loan of
$5,000, the debtor executes to the lender a chattel mortgage on certain
of the debtor's personal property. The law of the state requires re-
cordation within ten days in order for the recordation to relate back to
the date of the original transaction and provides that unrecorded chattel
mortgages are void as to lien creditors. Then, suppose that the lender
does not record the chattel mortgage until twenty days after the date
of the execution of the instrument, and fifteen days after the execution
of the chattel mortgage, X, who has been awarded judgment on a con-
tract claim for $100 against the debtor, obtains a lien on the personal
property covered by the chattel mortgage by levy under execution of the
judgment. Under the facts assumed, the chattel mortgage is void as to
X, since he has obtained a lien on the property prior to the recordation
of the chattel mortgage, and the trustee can assert X's rights and have
the chattel mortgage declared void as to him.81 Even though X's claim
is for only $100, under the doctrine of Moore v. Bay, the chattel mort-
gage would be void in toto, and the surplus over $100 would be dis-
tributed among the other creditors of the bankrupt.8 2
SiEcTioN 67
The final section of the Act to be considered, under which the trustee
is provided with an affirmative means to avoid transfers or obligations
7-284 U. S. 4 (1931).
SO See Schwartz, Moore v. Bay-Should Its Rule Be Abolished?, REF. J. Apr.
1955 at 67.§ 70 e.
's See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Collier, 106 F. 2d 584 (6th Cir.
1939); See also Zamore v. Golblatt, 194 F. 2d 933 (2d Cir. 1952), where the
court, in holding a chattel mortgage void as to the trustee said that the fact that
the trustee represented only one small creditor was immaterial, and cited Moore
v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4 (1931).
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of the bankrupt, is Section 67. This section, in subsection (a), invali-.
dates liens obtained through judicial processes within four months of
bankruptcy against the debtor's property under certain conditions. Sub-
section (d) of Section 67 sets up certain objective standards and de-
nounces as fraudulent every transfer made within one year of bank-
ruptcy which does not meet these standards. Further, provision is
made for the invalidation of such transfers by the trustee.
Due to the nature of the section and the belief that it does not,
generally speaking, apply with particular reference to an automobile
dealer in bankruptcy, no attempt will be made to discuss the provisions
of the section in any detail. However, parts of Section 67 d which
might with some frequency be of avail to the trustee in bankruptcy of an
automobile dealer will be set out.
Section 67 d (1) consists of definitions of words and phrases used
in the section and specifies that they are for the purposes of and ex-
clusively applicable to subsection d.
Section 67 d (2) provides:
"Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor
within one year of the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding
under this Act by or against him is fraudulent
a. as to creditors existing at the time of such transfer or obliga-
tion, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor
who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to
his actual intent.
b. as to then existing creditors and as to other persons who be-
come creditors during the continuance of a business or trans-
action, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor
who is engaged or is about to engage in such business or trans-
action, for which the property remaining in his hands is an un-
reasonably small capital, without regard to his actual intent.
c. as to then existing and future creditors, if made or incurred
without fair consideration by a debtor who intends to incur or
believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they
mature.
d. as to then existing and future creditors, if made or incurred
with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law,
to hinder, delay, or defraud either existing or future creditors."
It is apparent that a chattel mortgage, conditional sale or trust receipt
transaction could contain the elements enumerated in one of the above
subsections and thus be deemed fraudulent under the Section.m8 In each
"' An automobile dealer who obtained automobiles from a finance company under
trust receipts, binding him to resell for cash and to exercise good faith in protecting
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situation, the trustee should look to the provisions of this section and
determine if any of the bankrupt transactions contain the requisite ele-
ments of a fraudulent transfer or obligation.
Section 67 d (3) provides:
"Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor
who is or will thereby be rendered insolvent, within four months
prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this
Act by or against him is fraudulent as to then existing and future
creditors: (a) if made or incurred in contemplation of the filing
of a petition initiating a proceeding under this Act by or against
the debtor or in contemplation of liquidation of all or the greater
portion of the debtor's property, with intent to use the considera-
tion obtained for such transfer or obligation to enable any creditor
of such debtor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
some other creditor of the same class, and (b) if the transferee or
obligee of such transfer or obligation, knew or believed that the
debtor intended to make such use of such consideration."
It seems that there will be few occasions when the trustee of a bank-
rupt automobile dealer will find present in a transaction all the requisite
elements of this section, but cognizance must be taken of it in order that
the trustee exhaust all possibilities against transfers and obligations of
the bankrupt. It is again possible that a chattel mortgage, conditional
sale or trust receipt transaction would fall within the purview of this
section.
Section 67 d (5) provides in essence, that a transfer, for purposes of
this section only, will not be deemed to have been made until it becomes
perfected against a bona fide purchaser from the debtor, and that if
the transfer is not so perfected before bankruptcy, it will be deemed
to have been made immediately before the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy. The contrast between the perfection test under Section 67 and
that of Section 60 should be noted. Under Section 67, by making per-
fection against a bona fide purchaser the test of when a transfer will be
deemed to have been made, the chances are greatly increased that
perfection, to such a degree, will not be accomplished until within the
stipulated period prior to bankruptcy.
Section 67 d (6) provides that a transfer or obligation which is
deemed fraudulent under this section against creditors of the debtor,
having claims provable under the Act, shall be deemed null and void
the finance company's interest, but who resold for credit and transferred the notes
to another finance company, was held to have transferred or conveyed his property
with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors within the statutory definition
of "act of bankruptcy." In re Thompson, 28 F. Supp. 707 (W. D. La. 1939).
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against the trustee, except as to a bona fide purchaser, lienor, or obligee
for a present fair equivalent value.
It is to be noted that Section 67 sets up standards peculiar to the
Bankruptcy Act by which transfers and obligations will be adjudged
fraudulent, whereas Section 70 e provides that any transfers or obliga-
tions which under state law would be void as to any creditor, are void
as to the trustee. Therefore, in considering the applicability of Section
67, the trustee need only look to the provisions of the Act in determining
whether or not a particular transaction can be adjudged fraudulent.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that the trustee of the bankrupt automobile dealer
may be confronted with creditors who claim liens on the automobiles in
stock either by virtue of trust receipts, conditional sales or chattel mort-
gages. We have also seen that the validity of the claimed liens will
vary even under the same circumstances depending on the requirements
of state law. And we have finally seen that the trustee has three sections
of the Bankruptcy Act, 60, 67 and 70, under which he may possibly
defeat the claim of the alleged lien creditor.
The possibility of increasing instances of automobile dealers in bank-
ruptcy gives added importance to these three sections, since thorough
knowledge and understanding of them is essential to those who as
trustees in bankrupty are charged in the future with the administration
of the estates of automobile dealers.
